children, as compared to adjudication of matters involving large business entities; 7 and the inapplicability of "rules of civil procedure" to "summary proceedings" that overwhelmingly impact indigent litigants. 8 The course may also examine, by way of contrast, fora whose degrees of process and resource allocation vastly exceed the volume of cases they adjudicate, such as federal courts. 9 The Judicial Opinion: 1110 Credit This course, offered during orientation, explores the limited role judicial opinions play in understanding law; 10 the overwhelming correlation between judges' political and policy affiliations in predicting judicial outcomes; 11 how endless citations of precedent and legal analysis in opinions function as an ex post facto means to justify foregone conclusions; 12 and judicial opinions as a means for presenting a veneer of rationality and scientific precision. 13 As part of this course, students will choose a judicial opin- 7 Rhode noted that "civil courts take weeks to try a commercial dispute between wealthy businesses but give less than five minutes to decide the future of an abused or neglected child .... " Rhode, supra note 6, at 1793. 8 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,64-65 (1972) (holding that conducting a trial within six days of filing a landlord-tenant case, unless the tenant posts bond, does not violate the Constitution). 9 Of nearly one million cases filed in the United States in 2001, less than three percent were in the federal system. See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS & NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS' COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002:
A NAT'L PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STA-TISTICS PROJECT 13 (2003) . Furthermore, federal courts marginalize those cases that typically involve low-income litigants, such as petitions for habeas corpus and reviews of denials of Social Security benefits, as necessary evils, and afford them minimal scrutiny. See Rubinson, supra note 5, at 107. Instead, federal courts primarily devote their available resources to "high-stakes, 'betthe-the-company' business cases .... " Bryant G. Garth ( questioning whether "pronouncements" in opinions are "in fact an accurate reflection of law as understood in the world ... " and suggesting that "[w]e can better understand law by moving beyond our court-centric perspective ... ").
II One computer model correctly predicted seventy-five percent of Supreme Court outcomes based solely on a limited number of variables, such as "ideological direction ... of the lower court ruling," and without reference to the "facts" of the case. Theodore W. Ruger ion of at least sixty pages 14 and draft a full explanation of, and basis for, the decision in three pages or less. IS NOTE: This course fulfills the legal analysis requirement.
The Supreme Court I: III 0 Credit This course examines judicial opinions by the High Court. Topics include the reality that the current Justices have rarely, if ever, represented individual clients in practice; 16 the extraordinary attention lavished by academics and other legal commentators on the Court's hyper-technical arguments and dense thickets of citations and logical forms to justify preexisting conclusions; l7 the ability to predict decisions across a wide range of substantive areas based on a judge's ideology without knowing a single precedent or reading a single brief; 18 an examination of whether the rule that the Supreme Court is the only court in which "Court" must be capitalized at all times is analogous to the capitalization of the names of Supreme Deities. 19 14 An overwhelmingly large number of opinions fit this criterion, so the instructor will provide a more limited list in order to facilitate students' ability to make a choice. Consider 15 In a letter to Harold Laski, Holmes recounted, "I have sent round an opinion in which I take three pages to say what should be said in a sentence, but which Brandeis thought ought to be put in solemn form because of its importance." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Nov. 30, 1917) in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 114 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 1953). In crafting this assignment, Holmes's statement has been reduced to a ratio: three sentences would equal about forty words, and three pages, assuming the standard of 250 words per page, would equal 750 words. This reduces then to the following arithmetic: 40 -i-750 = 0.053. Thus, a sixty-page opinion times 0.053 equals 3.18, which, after rounding, would equal three pages. Otherwise, lengthy concurrences and dissents of individual justices who believe that the nuances of their distinct jurisprudence warrant detailed study can be summarized in a sentence or two. 16 This course focuses on the circumstances faced by litigants in selected matters decided by the Court. The topics covered will vary based upon available opportunities for observation or participation, but may include witnessing an execution in order to assess the Court's decisions regarding whether capital punishment is cruel and unusual;20 visiting homeless shelters and soup kitchens to explore the Court's jurisprudence on due process-specifically how it has not been extended to ensure the right to food, shelter, or other means of subsistence; 21 residing in an urban neighborhood riddled by handgun violence to assess the role that handguns play in contemporary society in contrast to the role of well-regulated militias in rural America in 1791;22 attempting to exercise First Amendment rights as an individual compared with multi-national legal entities that are not human beings and which possess massive aggregations of capital; 23 assessing how the First Amendment promotes the "marketplace of ideas" when entry into the marketplace can only be secured by wealthy individuals who have resources to buy ideas sold in the marketplace. 24
Property: 3 Credits
This course examines the impact of property law on the mass ofindividuals whose property "interests" are as tenants and owners of modest homes at risk of foreclosure or who are homeless and thus do not have one stick, let alone a "bundle" of them. 25 Most of the course entails interviewing individu- 20 Judge Alex Kozinski has offered the following reflections on this subject: Though I've now had a hand in a dozen or more executions, I have never witnessed one .... I sometimes wonder whether those of us who make life-and-death decisions on a regular basis should not be required to watch as the machinery of death grinds up a human being. I ponder what it says about me that I can, with cool precision, cast votes and write opinions that seal another human being's fate but lack the courage to witness the consequences of my actions. 25 The metaphor of a "bundle of sticks" or "bundle of rights" is often used to describe legal "rights" in property. Lee Ann Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1955 REv. , 1978 (2012). als whose homes have been foreclosed,26 who have been evicted,27 or who are homeless, and explores the extent to which low and minimum wage jobs cannot secure livable and affordable housing. 28 There will be no more than thirty minutes devoted to government subsidies for mortgage interest, lower tax rates for capital gains, or exploration of the "rights" of owners of parcels of land named Blackacre and Whiteacre.
The Unrepresented Client: 6 Credits This course will be co-taught by low-income litigants who have claims adjudicated with minimal process and without representation. Topics to be covered: the overwhelmingly high percentage of litigants who are not represented in various proceedings and whose cases constitute the majority of adjudicated matters;29 the instructors' experience as low-income litigants in the judicial system;30 whether an "adversary system" is truly "adversarial" when there is only one lawyer; 31 how favoritism impedes the ability of pro 26 Arranging such interviews is quite simple given that the supply of foreclosed homes far outstrips the number of law students who will need to complete this assigmnent. For the degree of "process" accorded such claims, see sources cited supra note 3 and accompanying text. 27 A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure eqnal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL. (2013). There are, however, no obligations in the Rules for lawyers to do anything about this core "deficiency." See id. R. 6.1 (providing for "voluntary pro bono public service") (emphasis added).
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 3 Credits
This course explores the application of the Sixth Amendment to the representation of indigent criminal defendants. The course will briefly touch upon the constitutional provisions pertaining to criminal prosecutions. It will then focus exclusively on plea bargaining and the "procedures" implemented by all criminal courts that cannot accommodate any result other than plea bargaining. 37 The course will also survey the overwhelming caseloads of public defenders;38 the characterization of adjudication in the criminal courts as "meet 'em and plead 'em," "cattle herding," and "McJustice,,,39 and the law of ineffective assistance of counsel, particularly the evolving jurisprudence on whether sleeping lawyers in capital cases have provided effective assistance of counsel. 40 Other topics: the criminalization ofpoverty41 and racialization of criminal prosecutions. This course provides an overview of the ways attorneys can generate substantial compensation by representing large organizations. The course will only briefly address the "substantive" areas of law on which such representation typically focuses, such as taxation and business organizations. The course will instead explore why less lucrative areas of legal services, such as representing low-income litigants who otherwise could not afford representation, pay too little to service the debt students incur to afford law school tuition. 43 Gender, Race, Socioeconomics, and Intersectionality: 3 Credits This course explores how individual experience defines one's interpretation of "law," while the leading interpreters of "law" maintain that their conclusions are driven by "strict interpretation" and plain meaning of the cross since he objected near the end of questioning," and thus Muniz "[could not] establish that his trial counsel was asleep for a substantial portion of his trial." Id If time permits, the course will explore how these holdings reflect the framers' intent, which can be discerned in light of the how the Constitutional Convention took place in the oppressive heat of a Philadelphia summer in 1787. Given this weather, the framers no doubt were fatigued, and thus they both experienced and understood the value of sleep while deliberating about the founding document of the nation. For a discussion of Philadelphia weather during the Constitutional Convention, see SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325-26 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) (examining historical weather records and finding that the average temperature in Philadelphia in 1787 was 93.8 degrees from June through September). 41 43 For 2014, the median entry level salary at a legal services organization was $44,600, while the starting salary at a large private firm in a city was $160,000. Jobs & JDs-Class of 2013 Selected Findings, NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Aug. 2014), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/ Classof20 13 SelectedFindings. pdf. As noted by James Leipold, Executive Director of the National Association of Law Placement, "public interest and public sector salaries have just kept pace with inflation" while "the cost of legal education and the average amount of law student loan debt have both risen at a much higher pace," thus creating "significant economic disincentives ... as law students consider whether or not to pursue public interest law careers." Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement An exploration of how legal education, with the exception of the Holmes School of Law, has nothing to do with law. 46 This course will focus on the usefulness of pre-digested hypotheticals when no client has ever presented an attorney with a fact pattern or "Statement of Facts"; assessing whether the "case method" reflects the realities of adjudication, especially where freedom and safety are at stake, such as in criminal prosecution and child abuse and neglect proceedings,47 and the misleading perception that elite law schools produce more "competent" practitioners. 48 This Proposal, having set forth a Mission Statement in Part I and a course catalogue in Part II, will now elaborate on the Proposal's underlying basis. As Part III explains, Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected the idea that logic-the purported core of conventional legal analysis-constitutes law. This is a "dangerous idea" because it subverts the norms of legal education and judicial decision making. Part IV contrasts the pedagogy of the Holmes School with traditional legal education in light of Holmes's dangerous idea. Part V examines the educational methodology of the Holmes School. Part VI identifies, and counters, the most obvious objections to this Proposal. 44 
III. INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS: HOLMES'S DANGEROUS IDEA 49
The founding principles of the Holmes School of Law are drawn from ideas articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes and other legal realists who wrote primarily in the early twentieth century. 50 Holmes challenged the logical foundation of "law" and, by extension, traditional legal education. 51 He argued that judicial decisions are not, and could not be, products of logic, but rather products of submerged judgments and policy preferences.
52 Although legal scholars still hold Holmes in high esteem, 53 the full consequences of his ideas remain too outre for mainstream conceptions of law. 54 Holmes's famous essay The Path of the Law captures the essence of his critique:
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic . . . [b Jut certainty generally is illusion .... Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form .... [Such a conclusion, however,] is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measure- 49 The phrase "dangerous idea" comes from DANIEL C. DENNETT slOns.
The following Chinese proverb echoes Holmes's sentiment: "A judge decides for ten reasons/nine of which nobody knows. ,,56 Succeeding realists explored the extraordinary technical skill brought to bear in efforts to present conclusions in logical dress. Felix Cohen, for example, satirizes a formalist "heaven" in which he describes a dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an indefinite number of meanings out of any text or statute, an apparatus for constructing fictions, and a hair-splitting machine that could divide a single hair into 999,999 equal parts and, when operated by the most expert jurists, could split each of these parts again into 999,999 equal parts.
57
The image of the "dialectic-hydraulic-interpretive press" illustrates how any judgment can be presented in logical form. 58 Hairs can be split in numerous ways. The splitting might seem "objective" or "true" but, according to Holmes, the splitting is a means to justify a conclusion rather than a means to reach a conclusion. 59 In place of its traditional definition, Holmes offered an alternative view of law. 60 According to Holmes, law is " [t] he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more .... ,,61 "Courts in fact" are what courts do in fact; they are situated within a factual matrix. 62 Moreover, facts are textured and variegated, having little to do with the misleadingly 55 Holmes, supra note 12, at 465--66. Holmes reiterated his rejection of logical form by writing that "[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. stripped down "statement of facts" in judicial opinions, which are tellingly situated as an introduction to the main event-the interpretation of "law."
Holmes further identifies what is not law. 63 Law is not the law of contracts, criminal law, property law, or family law. Law is not treatises; and contrary to what children learn in grammar school, law is not what the legislative branch legislates, the executive branch executes, or the judicial branch judges.64 Law is not appellate opinions, despite being subject to laser-like scrutiny.6s An opinion alone, without the facts that gave rise to the decision, is thus "hopelessly oversimplified.,,66 All of these things collectively are what Richard Posner has called "law's traditional preoccupations,,,67 which are, not coincidentally, the "traditional preoccupations" of legal education. 68 For Holmes, law is the lived experience of a civil defendant in a debt collection case, or a criminal defendant facing drug charges, or a tenant seeking to avoid eviction, or a mother seeking to retain custody of her child. These, for sure, fall superficially into the respective laws of contracts, criminal law, property law, and family law. But the "law"-rules, procedures, cases-that "define" these areas do not tell us much. 69 Or, at least, they tell us much less than an inside-out perspective with "law" as merely one piece of the picture-and a pretty unimportant one at that. 70 Law also pervades lives in ways that have nothing to do with courts or adjudication. For example, masses of forms, legal regulations, interviews, and hours of waiting in line confront low-income people at every turn. ( "education has to start at the earliest levels by teaching school children at a young age about the doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of law"). As the premise of the Holmes School demonstrates, children should also learn "at a young age" about the limitations of the "rule of law."
"experience" includes "everything that arises out of the interaction of the human organism with its environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies, prejudices . These experiences are law.
Getting a handle on this Holmesian view of law is no easy task, as Holmes himself seemed to recognize. Louis Brandeis suggested to Holmes that he study "some domain of fact" such as "the textile industries in Massachusetts and after reading the reports sufficiently ... ," he should "go to Lawrence and get a human notion of how it really is.,,73 By Brandeis's estimation, Lawrence, Massachusetts-the site of a massive textile industry in which a largely female, poor, immigrant population worked and lived in deplorable conditions and conducted a strike of historic significance to the labor movement-was a good place to go to capture the lived experience that constitutes law. 74 Holmes's ambivalence about taking the trip, however, 
(noting that, in "most North American cities," the "service qnality" of public transportation is "minimal," leading to "a huge difference in convenience, comfort and safety between motorists and non-motorists (and therefore between wealthy and poor .... ) ... "). For instance, poor public transportation affects a person's ability to adapt to the unpredictable schedules of many low-wage jobs, to manage childcare, and to transport children to school. No effort has been made to codify a "bus passenger bill of rights" for delays, mechanical breakdowns, or lack of safety despite the pervasiveness of these problems. Reliance on public transportation can also have tragic consequences. See id. After Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans mass transit system automatically transported stranded residents-virtually all of whom were low-income-to the New Orleans Superdome where they had no choice but to live in the chaos, danger, and squalor to be found there. Id.at 3. Subsequent realists expanded upon Holmes's dangerous idea. Karl N. Llewellyn emphasized the contingencies of real life that affect a litigant's ability to recover under a rule of "law.,,76 For example, in describing the "law" that governs a party's "right" to demand performance under a contract, Llewellyn explained that if the other party does not perform as agreed, you can sue, and if you have a fair lawyer, and nothing goes wrong with your witnesses or the jury, and you give up four or five days of time and some ten to thirty percent of the proceeds, and wait two to twenty months, you will probably get a judgment for a sum considerably less than what the performance would have been worth-which, if the other party is solvent and has not secreted his assets, you can in further due course collect with six percent interest for the delay. 77 In a different vein, Felix Cohen drew upon Holmes's conception oflaw as a social act. 78 For instance, Cohen argued that judicial opinions are based on human activity rather than the development of precedent, and noted that a judicial decision "is an intersection of social forces: Behind the decision are social forces that play upon it to give it a resultant momentum and direction; beyond the decision are human activities affected by it.,,79
In the end, then, the fundamental premise of "realism," and, by extension, of the Holmes School of Law, is that law is about how the mass of people live in the world. 8o Conventional law school curricula do not define law in this way, and this is to maintain legitimacy as an "objective" analysis driven by the rigorous application of logic. 81 Such realities of law are too messy and too subversive of popular conceptions of "the rule of law" to comport with law schools' focus on logic. 82 The Holmes School of Law tion contained particular bite given that Lawrence is less than thirty miles from Boston, where Holmes grew up, and thus would require minimal effort on Holmes's part to see "how it really is. 81 See supra notes 51--68 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 84-86 and accompanyingtext. 82 For instance, the father of modem law school pedagogy, Christopher Columbus Langdell, argued that, to improve legal education, it was "indispensable to establish at least two things: first, that law is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that science are contained in thus seeks to determine (1) what law is in all its messiness, social contexts, and assumptions-its reality "on the ground," and (2) what law is to the vast majority oflitigants who have few or no resources.
IV. THE PEDAGOGY OF THE HOLMES SCHOOL
The Holmes School of Law builds upon critiques of "law" and legal education that extend back over a century.83 This Proposal examines how the Holmes School's curriculum fits into prior critiques oflegal education, how its premises differ from other calls for reform, and how it will implement its signature pedagogy to achieve its goals.
A. Langdellian Science and Logic vs. Clinical Education and "Practical Knowledge"
Well over one hundred years ago, Christopher Columbus Langdell developed the "case method"-the law school pedagogy that has remained the bedrock oflegal education ever since. 84 The case method assumes that cases are the lifeblood of "law," and that "thinking like a lawyer" entails developing or "synthesizing" rules from cases to produce certain results. 85 As any first year law student knows, the case method is the primary-if not the exclusive-vehicle for learning what "law" is. 86 86 This footnote is inserted solely for the sake of appearances. Any informed reader does not need support for this proposition.
Jerome Frank offered an early and still idiosyncratic critique of the case method by attacking the very idea that the "case" method deals with "cases.,,87 Frank observed that students do not study cases; rather "[t]heir attention is restricted to judicial opinions. But an opinion is not a decision.,,88 The case method, according to Frank, is really the opinion method. 89 An "opinion" says nothing about decision making or why a judge reached a particular decision. 90 The case method fails for many reasons: (1) it "disclos[es] merely a fractional part of how decisions come into being;" (2) it encourages within a lawyer and law student "a treacherously false sense of certainty in advising clients;" (3) it "is hopelessly oversimplified;" and (4) it fails to take into account "the slippery character of 'the facts' of a case.,,91
A more widely articulated critique not only rejects the value of examining cases, opinions, and decisions, but rather advocates for focusing on "practice."n This critique leads directly into the motivation behind the clinical education movement. 93
Professors and practitioners have consistently advocated for clinical education since the nineteenth century.94 Consider the following selection of quotations:
84.
Professor Blewett Lee of Harvard Law School in 1896:
It is odd if our profession is the only one in which students cannot have a practical training before they enter their life-work ....
[M]ost law students still go forth upon a long suffering public having only read books and disputed over them. The evil of this condition cannot be remedied by any half measures, or cheap devices or cheap men. To give practical instruction in law work will require immense intellectual labor, and the finest quality of teaching-but let us not say it is impossible because we have never done it .... 95 87 See Frank, supra note 65, at 910. 88Id. 89 See id. 90 See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text. 91 See Frank, supra note 65, at 911, 913, 919. 92 See Barry et aI., supra note 84, at 6-7. 93 For an overview of the history of clinical education, see generally Barry et aI., supra note 94 One could make a plausible argument that apprenticeship-the foundation of legal education in the United States before states began requiring law school graduation for bar admittanceis itself clinical legal education, but, in practice, these apprenticeships were ad hoc affairs and certainly had no systematic pedagogy-a defining characteristic of clinical education. [A] considerable part of the teaching staff of a law school should consist of lawyers who already had varied experience in practice .... What is intended is that, almost at the beginning of and during his law-school days, the student should learn the very limited (although real) importance of the actual legal world of so-called substantive law and of so-called legal rules and principles. He should learn that "legal rights" and "duties" mean merely what may some day happen at the end of specific lawsuits . . . . He should learn that judges are fallible human beings and that legal rights often depend on the unpredictable reactions of those fallible human beings to a multitude of stimuli .... 97 Despite these longstanding critiques, clinical education only came into its own in the 1960s, when it "solidified ... its foothold in the academy. ,, 98 Depending on the institution, however, many issues continue to bedevil clinical education. Such issues include law schools' willingness to develop or maintain a "clinical program" with limited resources, the status and job security of clinical faculty (if, indeed, they are even called "faculty"), and the condescension of teachers of "doctrinal courses" who contend that clinics merely teach "skills," not "theory" or "doctrine," which require greater intelligence and sophistication. Clinical legal education has nevertheless been remarkably successful in establishing the importance of teaching lawyers how to practice. lOo
B. The Ensuing Debate: Theory and Practice and Why It Is Beside the Point
There is a longstanding tension between "theory" and "practice," "doctrinal" and "clinical." The "Carnegie Report" lOl_a recent assessment oflegal education-characterizes the debate as a "conflict between defenders oftheoretical legal learning and champions of a legal education that includes introduction to the practice of law.,,102 Studies of legal education, including the "Mac Crate Report,,103 and the Carnegie Report, attempt to resolve the tension between conceptions of law school as a professional school teaching students how to be lawyers, and as an "academic institution" devoted to scientific and "theoretical" inquiry about law. 104 These efforts see both views as complementary, and propose integrating them to create more comprehensive legal education. For example, the authors of the Carnegie Report frame their project as "seek[ing] to unite the two sides of legal knowledge: formal knowledge and experience of practice."lOs The goal of legal education thus should be "to bring the teaching and learning oflegal doctrine into more fruitful dialogue with the pedagogies of practice" and "to bridge the gap between analytical and practical [legal] knowledge.,,106
The Holmes School of Law, in contrast, would reject the purported dichotomy between the "theoretical" and "practical." They are not, as the Carnegie Report frames it, "two sides of legal knowledge;" they do not describe collectively or separately what law is. 107 Rather, the Holmes School would examine what happens when people encounter rules (regulatory, statutory, or constitutional), procedures (whether formal or informal 108), court forms, clerks, social workers, and lawyers,109 and explores legal claims that are not asserted because potential litigants do not know they have them. 110 What exactly are "practical skills" and "theory" when neither has meaning in actual experience; III when "process" accorded litigants is wildly divergent and, at times, chaotic and virtually non-existent; 112 when any "theory" is, in the end, based on personal experience, which likely has nothing to do with "on the ground" interactions with law?ll3 Answering these questions, or recognizing that these questions are worth asking, or, even admitting that these questions exist, is a core goal of the Holmes School of Law.
107 CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 83, at 12; see supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. 108 For instance, one court in Maryland---called "Rent Court"-was created by administrative fiat, and imposed faux "jurisdictional limitations" with no legislative basis. See Williams v. Hous. Auth., 760 A.2d 697, 698, 700, 703 (Md. 2000) (noting that the district court dismissed lowincome tenant's action on the grounds that "rent division" lacked jurisdiction, even though there is no separate "rent division" in Baltimore City). Low-income litigants must also contend with the vagaries of clerks who might or might not adhere to procedural rules, which, in tum, may preclude such litigants from pursuing claims that they probably did not know they had in the first place because they did not have lawyers. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. Finally, lowincome litigants are often relegated to "pleadings" of the "check the box" variety, which is one way courts manage to dispose of hundreds of thousands of cases. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. It is notable that courts deploy, or are forced to deploy, such administrative conveniences when safety and shelter is at risk as opposed to conflicts involving large entities, which warrant a far greater allocation of judicial resources. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. 109 Note that lawyers are stuck in the middle of a long list. The reason for this is that most litigants don't have lawyers. Their interactions with law are more often with clerks, social workers, or public assistance caseworkers than with lawyers. III According to the drafters of the Carnegie Report, "legal analysis is the prior condition for practice because it supplies the essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the world through the medium of the law." CARNEGIE REpORT, supra note 83, at 13. This formulation, however, has it exactly backwards: the world itself furnishes the essential background assumptions for application of legal analysis. 112 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text. 113 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
v . LAW IN THE HOLMES SCHOOL
So if law were to be considered "law in fact," what would law school look like? It would largely entail examining the experience of litigants who are represented, litigants who are not represented, and litigants who are represented but have lawyers with overwhelming caseloads, who are poorly prepared, or who are just not very good. If law schools studied "law in fact," they would undertake to understand how many claims are not claimed because the claimants do not have the knowledge or resources to claim them.114 The study of "law in fact" would also examine geographic differences among urban and rural courts, differences based on ')urisdiction"-such as among federal courts, state courts, family courts, small claims courts, and "rent courts," differences among governmental yet non-judicial fora such as administrative tribunals, and differences among extra-judicial or non-judicial processes such as arbitration and mediation. It would compare appellate courts with trial courts. More generally, the study of "law in fact" would look at the law's impact or non-impact on actual human beings.
By jettisoning traditional law school pedagogy, the Holmes School takes Holmes's dangerous idea to its logical conclusion which, in tum, leads to what Daniel Dennett has called, in a different context, "universal acid:" Universal acid is a liquid so corrosive that it will eat through anything! .... It dissolves glass bottles and stainless-steel canisters as readily as paper bags. What would happen if you somehow came upon or created a dollop of universal acid? Would the whole planet eventually be destroyed? What would it leave in its wake? .... [I]t eats through just about every traditional concept, and leaves in its wake a revolutionized world-view, with most of the old landmarks still recognizable, but transformed in fundamental ways.11S
Holmes's "universal acid" would, if applied or even taken seriously, "eat through" settled notions of "law." Holmes's dangerous idea is more than a "paradigm shift. ,,116 It does not shift traditional legal tenets; it eliminates them. The Holmes School insists on studying "law in context." Given 114 See supra note 11 0 and accompanying text. 115 Dennett, supra note 49, at 63. Holmes employed a related metaphor-"cynical acid"-to refer to the impact of his ideas. See Holmes, supra note 12, at 461-62. "Universal acid" more accurately captures Holmes's ideas, however, because (to continue the metaphor) it corrodes through everything. Felix Cohen, however, referred to "cynical acid" as "Holmes' suggestive phrase." Cohen, supra note 34, at 830. 116 See THOMAS S. KUHN, 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 42-51, (1970) (introducing the concept of a paradigm shift). that every context is unique, and that context only resides in fluidity and messiness, there is never a point of rest; no set of bedrock principles are transferable across contexts.
A rare example of a realist who accepted the challenge of implementing this worldview was Felix Cohen in Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach.117 Cohen does take Holmes seriously, noting that Holmes offered a "basis for the redefinition of every legal concept .... "llS Cohen undertook to see, learn about, and teach law through a Holmesian lens. He defined jurisprudence as a study of human behavior."ll9 According to Cohen, Law is a social process, a complex of human activities, and an adequate legal science must deal with human activity, with cause and effect, with the past and the future .... Legal systems, principles, rules, institutions, concepts, and decisions can be understood only as functions of human behavior. 120
Cohen, however, continued to grasp at the rational and the systematic. Attempting to gain traction in a Holmesian world, Cohen summoned the scientific method in the context of the social sciences of sociology, economics, and psychology.121 He sought to maintain the legitimacy of law through science, albeit with a Holmesian twist.
Although Cohen's efforts are valiant, his method fails because, as Anthony Amsterdam has noted, "no system of concepts . . . are as numerous, variegated, and nuanced as the circumstances which bring the system into play." 122 Cohen thus falls into the trap of imposing a system through science that shapes and defines what "law" is, and, in so doing, loses its focus on reality. Cohen replaces one set of "simplifications" with another. 123 In Cohen's conception, the "universal acid" is not universal after all. 117 See Cohen, supra note 34, at 821-22. llS 123 Stanley Fish similarly challenged the idea of "critical self-consciousness"-the notion that critical theory reaches a "rea!" perspective that succeeds (to some degree) in capturing "reality." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 436-57 (1989) . Fish notes that all "perspectives"-including "critical" ones-are never as nnanced as the circumstances that bring them into play. Id at 436.
In contrast, the Holmes School curriculum and pedagogy does not aspire to be particularly scientific or systematic. It requires the minimization of "concepts" and systematic ways of thinking that shape and mislead. Rather, the signature pedagogy of the Holmes School is experiential. It encourages lawyers and law students to go and see places, to grapple with context, confront and recognize contradictions. It promotes "get [ting] somewhere with the matter at hand" by suspecting that "you are not quite getting it right.,,124 It means going to Lawrence, Massachusetts to see how h · 11 125 t mgs rea yare.
So how to get students to Lawrence, Massachusetts? By going there, of course. Going there, however, can happen in many ways. It can be going someplace physically. It can be going someplace through narratives, especially from people who have experienced the place. 126 It can also be going someplace through art-visual, written, or oral. "Going" implies a movement unmediated by "law" in order to see what law really means in context.
VI. LIKELY OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
No doubt many would disagree with the principles of the Holmes School. The following anticipates two of the foreseeable objections, with responses.
For some critics, the Proposal merely seeks to indoctrinate students to a leftist agenda that is anathema to a neutral institution of higher learning. They would argue that the name of the school should really be the "Marx School for Undermining the Free Market for Legal Services and Indoctrinating Students in So-Called 'Social Justice,' which Is Really Code for Socialism."
This argument, however, misses the point. The principles forming the basis of the Proposed Holmes School are descriptive. The extensive footnotes that accompany much of this Proposal, especially the course descriptions, merely describe what law is to the vast majority of Americans. 127 Indeed, it is the "conventional" law school curriculum that embodies fundamental political and ideological premises. First year classes omit any reference to what the vast majority of Americans experience as law, which reveals law schools' assumptions concerning what is or is not worth know- 124 See CLIFFORD REv. 1929 REv. , 1931 REv. , 1934 REv. (1991 (arguing that judges should consider narratives written by and about members of oppressed and marginalized groups in order to more deeply understand their lives). 127 It is worth noting that the Proposal does not cite Karl Marx.
ing. 128 Its premises, however, are masked by a veneer of "rigor," "logic," and "thinking like a lawyer," which effectively keeps its biases well hidden.
Further, Holmes-the school's namesake and originator of many of its premises-was no radical. To the contrary, he evidenced "hostility to most social reform .... " 129 His greatest enthusiasm for a particular social policy was for eugenics-the forced sterilization of, as he put it, degenerates and imbeciles.l3O While Holmes's appalling view of Social Darwinism is happily beyond the pale for virtually everyone, judges identified as "conservatives" would nevertheless find many things to like in the curriculum of the Holmes School. 131 Finally, the rhetoric of the profession has acknowledged and excoriated time and time again the profound deficiencies in the average citizen's access to justice. 132 This endless repetition, despite sounding grand, has had pernicious consequences; it has transformed an immediate crisis into an ongoing "problem" calling for an eventual solution. This is a crisis, however, that violates or, at best, risks basic human rights to subsistence, shelter, and raising children. 133 The Holmes School reintroduces the centrality and immediacy of this crisis that individuals of all political stripes recognize exists. 
Id.
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Second, critics will argue that the Proposal is "holier than thou." This may be a fair critique. The Proposal however, is certainly no holier than traditional references to the ''High Court," "sanctity" of law, and "prayer for relief. ,,134 CONCLUSION This Proposal makes sober good sense and offers as close a reflection of the world oflaw as it is, and, sadly, how it will likely be in the future. For this reason, it will never fully see the light of day. Even if not, however, it reflects the reality of law. Surely the reality of law has a place in legal education, even if it is only a single trip to Lawrence, Massachusetts.
